

~~SECRET~~

2nd Indorsement

Major Robert Bishop, 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov.) APO 512, U.S. Army.

To: Commanding Officer, 2677th Reg. OSS (Prov.) APO 512 U.S. Army.

1. In reply to the unsatisfactory entries on the foregoing efficiency report delivered to me on 13 June 1945, the following is respectfully submitted:

A. Cooperation. It is understood that cooperation refers to the ability to act jointly with juniors and seniors and effectively with another or others to attain a designated objective. In this connection it is believed that the record of X-2 Branch, Bucharest, including 700 official reports of which more than 200 were submitted during the period in question are in themselves a substantial reply, particularly in view of the fact that at no time from Washington, London or Caserta was there ever one word of criticism, with the exceptional and rare complaint from London that there were not enough carbon copies. How were these reports obtained and processed? How was it possible to produce so many in so short a period? Only by cooperation with many other persons. Having arrived in Bucharest in September 1944 without another person in X-2 it was necessary to recruit a cooperative staff of agents and to obtain a cooperative office staff. It was also necessary in order to achieve this volume of production to cooperate with and to receive the cooperation of other agencies. It should be borne in mind that the staff of X-2 obtained more than a ton of German captured Russian intelligence including many maps of Russia by the Russians with corrections by the Germans. X-2 obtained more than 200 German films containing vital information for the use of other branches. It was not by any mere chance that these were obtained. It was because X-2 personnel had the confidence of and the cooperation of Roumanian official sources.

1. X-2 was constantly cooperating with General Schuyler and other members of the ACC and providing service for which there were repeated expressions of appreciation. All civilian personnel employed by the ACC was vetted by X-2. General Schuyler seldom accepted a social invitation without asking a report from X-2. It was X-2 which provided the most detailed information on Japanese activities and their relationships with the Russians and other powers which enabled General Schuyler and Mr. Burton Y. Berry, the United States Representative in Roumania, to force the internment of the Japanese until the Russian-dictated FND regime took over the government. For this service there were many expressions of commendation and appreciation from both Mr. Berry and General Schuyler. When early in March X-2 obtained an outline of Russia's Three-Year

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
JUL 2006

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Page Two -----

Plan for Roumania as well as the knowledge of two additional Five-Year Plans there were expressions of appreciation from Mr. Berry, General Schuyler and Air Vice Marshal Stephenson of the British ACC to whom the General made the information available. There was always the closest cooperation with the American Legation and Mr. Berry's very fine staff. As an example of the cooperation given to the Legation X-2 discovered a Russian controlled activity which was attempting to penetrate the Legation. One of their first reports was intercepted by X-2 and the scheme destroyed.

2. There are many instances of cooperation with the State Department. X-2 Branch was called upon regularly to furnish information concerning American nationals who had remained in Roumania during the war. Then efforts were made to resume a certain amount of trade the first American ship was not permitted to leave the U.S. until the Legation in Bucharest named and approved a firm at the Port of Constanta to handle the cargo. The Legation would not send a report to Washington until an investigation of the firm had been conducted by X-2. In the Safe Haven project, the discovery of hidden enemy assets in neutral countries which is now the responsibility of the State Department, X-2 found that practically all of these assets had been sent to Roumania before transfer to neutral countries because of the favorable and open black market exchange which made it possible to increase the value of the assets. The name of the man who handled nearly all of these transactions and his address are in our records.

3. The fine spirit and wholehearted cooperation with the intelligence staff of the British ACC are one of the brightest spots in the record of X-2 Branch. We arrived more than a month ahead of them and because of that were in a position to be of help and guidance. They reciprocated in every way possible making available to us SIME records which had been brought from Cairo. Due to the fact that the British have no intelligence unit similar to ours attached to their ACC they often called upon X-2 Branch to give them special service in the matter of investigations and surveillance. One especial service rendered to them was the discovery that one of their employes, Nadia Herescu, a beautiful girl often in the company of British and American officers, is an important Russian agent. It has been reported to me since my arrival in Italy that she has gone to Moscow for further training as one of our reports more than two months ago predicted. One of the great services rendered to the British was the discovery that the Russians obtained copies of their outgoing and incoming cables within three hours after they were sent or received. This discovery was made in connection with the cables the British sent and received concerning the matter of giving asylum to the former Prime Minister, General Radescu. The British obtained

SECRET

independent confirmation of this a few days later.

4. There is another British contact with whom I collaborated constantly and on the very closest possible basis. I am reluctant to mention him by name since this report must go forward and eventually will be read by a score of persons in AFHQ and later by many more in Washington. It would be unfair to him also to mention him by his symbol since I have been informed that all of our Roumanian symbols were exposed by someone in Washington. He is, however, the ISLD chief in Roumania with an organization in ten countries. He and his group also have contact with G-2. This organization functioned throughout the war and I have been informed by the British that it was most effective. After communication with the Allies was broken even before the events of 23 August, 1944, contact was reestablished through X-2, Bucharest, and was continuing in April 1945. This gentleman was my closest collaborator and it was through him that I was invited by the office of the Russian War Production Minister to visit Moscow. It was also through his contact and close personal friendship that I was given permission by the Russians to go to Budapest with him many weeks before any American or British officers entered the city.

5. These are but a few of many such examples all of which can be substantiated and I believe they demonstrate that I gave cooperation and received it in turn from those agencies and individuals with which and with whom X-2 Branch worked.

B. Judgment. While it is conceded that all of us make mistakes in judgment it is believed that isolated instances of mistakes in judgment should be carefully weighed and balanced against the officer's general record for sound judgment. It is respectfully submitted those accomplishments listed in paragraph A as well as others hereinafter mentioned would not have been possible if I had not generally exercised fairly good judgment in the discharge of my responsibilities. It is also respectfully submitted that in one instance, part of which occurred during the period covered by this report and part of which occurred while I was the acting commanding officer, that, through the exercise of sound judgment, in connection with the visit of Mme. Tanda Bragadiru this command, higher echelons, and possibly the United States of America were saved much embarrassment.

C. Leadership. There are two points which it is believed should be considered. The first is that of the loyalty, obedience, confidence, respect, and wholehearted cooperation on the part of the staff of X-2 Branch without which it would have been impossible to obtain the results herein mentioned as well as the production of such a large volume of material. The staff was at all times

SECRET

Page Four -----

ready and did very often work late hours in the evenings in order to keep abreast of a pressing volume of information which required processing. This refers to the office staff. In addition there were the many voluntary agents who served without compensation and at considerable personal risk. The second point is that for the most part the staff was composed of personnel who were there because of their own desire. The three enlisted men often expressed themselves to the effect that it was their first assignment under a chief who as they put it "was willing to give them a break" and would try to do something for them. This remark was repeated after I had ceased to be their chief. It may also be significant that after it became known that I was leaving Bucharest that no less than three members of my staff of six said they had been happy in their work with me but that with my departure they, too, wanted new assignments and asked me to assist them in any way possible.

D. Ability to Obtain Results. This should speak for itself. It is believed desirable, however, to summarize some of the outstanding results obtained, although some have been previously mentioned. Attention is invited to the following:

1. The production of more than 700 original intelligence reports, more than 200 of which were produced during the period covered by the foregoing report.
2. The successful penetration of the Russian Intelligence Service including a comprehensive report on the GUGBEEZ and, as far as I know, the discovery of it as it has been generally supposed that the NKVD (Military Police) was the Russian IS. This report, since well-substantiated by independent sources, includes both Russian internal and worldwide organizations.
3. The successful penetration of the Russian Politburo. Among other information obtained was Russia's Three-Year Plan for Roumania, details of Mr. Vishinski's visits to Bucharest and the several alternatives that the Moscow planners had in mind.
4. The discovery of a serious penetration by the Russians at the British Legation which enabled the Russians to obtain copies of both outgoing and incoming cables.
5. Assistance given to other branches of OSS included much valuable target information such as the exact location of plants in which the automatic parts of V bombs and machines were manufactured and later the location of plants in which the explosive parts were made. There was also the new location of the Abwehr radio station for Southeast Europe.

SECRET

Page Five -----

6. More than 200 rolls of German film were sent to Washington. These are considered of especial importance because of information concerning the Russians.

7. Approximately one ton of Russian information captured by the Germans was obtained, distributed to other branches and sent to Washington.

8. The systematic processing of several tons of German records, interrogation of numerous Germans and information produced by our agents gave us a wide knowledge of the German Intelligence Service in Roumania and enabled us to keep abreast of the German staybehind organization.

9. Discovery of a serious attempt to penetrate the American Legation and the interception of an agent's handwritten report on American activities enabled Legation personnel to protect themselves.

10. Production of Safe Haven information which shows that Roumania, because of its open black market and favorable rates of exchange, was the main channel for enemy assets going to all other countries.

11. Detailed information on widespread Japanese intelligence activities, the close relations of the Japanese with the Russians and other pertinent data enabled Mr. Berry and General Schuyler to have the Japanese interned.

12. A report was submitted in late February or early March which stated that Germany would surrender on or about 7 May 1945.

E. With respect to paragraph I of the foregoing efficiency report it is believed that the matter contained therein is not properly included in an efficiency report.

F. The unfavorable opinion expressed in paragraph D of the foregoing efficiency report causes me grave concern and some bewilderment due to the fact that the Commanding Officer did not see me once during the period covered by the report. Further, attention is respectfully invited to the fact that since I have been under his command the Commanding Officer and I have seen each other only on his rare visits to Bucharest, that we have never discussed my work and that the total elapsed time of all our social conver-


sations does not exceed twenty minutes. In view of these circumstances it would seem altogether proper to have the opinion of my immediate superior, Lt. Comdr. Frank G. Visner, with whom I had daily contact for five months and who was always present when the Commanding Officer saw me.

1. Concerning me and my work, Lt. Comdr. Visner has made the following written statement: "In the discharge of his duties he has at all times shown himself to be highly resourceful, intelligent, able and responsive to suggestion and command. In the handling of many unusually difficult and complex situations with which he has been confronted at this headquarters, he has never failed to use the best of judgment and discretion."

2. In paragraph 1 under instructions on the foregoing efficiency report it is stated that "a series of reports of an individual officer should present a highly accurate evaluation of his worth." In that connection attention is respectfully invited to my 66-1 card on which it may be noted that each and every efficiency rating is Superior. Every rating was made personally by a General Officer, who was my immediate superior and with whom I had daily contact.

/s/ Robert Bishop
/t/ Robert Bishop
Major, AC

A TRUE COPY:


GERALD R. MURPHY
Major, AGD

SECRET

EFFICIENCY REPORT

USE TYPEWRITER IF POSSIBLE
IF NOT, PLEASE PRINT

PREPARE THIS REPORT WITH PAINSTAKING ACCURACY. ITS VALUE LIES IN THE DEGREE OF OBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND SOUND CONSIDERED JUDGMENT DISPLAYED BY THE RATING OFFICER. READ INSTRUCTIONS.

SEE AR 600-185

A. PLACE OF ORIGIN OF REPORT

THEATER OR COMMAND MTOUSA	ORGANIZATION AND UNIT 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional)	DATE OF REPORT 1 May 1945
------------------------------	--	------------------------------

B. OFFICER REPORTED UPON

LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE INITIAL Bishop, Robert		SERIAL NUMBER 0 918 130	GRADE Major	ARM OR SERVICE AC	COM- PONENT AUS
DATE OF BIRTH 13 Nov 1908	SERVICE Limited General X	OFFICIAL STATUS OF OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO YOU Intelligence Officer under my command		PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT FROM 16 Feb 45 TO 22 Apr 45	

C. STATIONS AT WHICH OFFICER SERVED AND DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

STATIONS	DUTY ASSIGNMENTS	DAYS	PLACE "X" IN BOX OR BOXES TO CLASSIFY DUTY					
			STAFF		COMMAND		TRAIN- ING	ADMIN. & EXEC.
			COMBAT	NOT COMBAT	COMBAT	NOT COMBAT		
1. 2677 Regt OSS (Prov)	Intell O	66		X				
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								

D. WRITE A BRIEF GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THIS OFFICER. REFER TO POINTS OF WEAKNESS AS WELL AS STRENGTH. UNFAVORABLE ENTRIES OF OPINION IN THIS ESTIMATE NEED NOT BE REFERRED TO THE OFFICER BEING RATED.

The officer makes a good appearance, has a fair personality and a rather glib manner. He lacks sincerity, reliability and does not use to best advantage a certain amount of native intelligence. He has not been able to gain respect from either his subordinates or associates.

E.

ALL ENTRIES
ARE FORMULATED
ON THE FOLLOWING

BASED ON	X	ATTITUDE	X
INTIMATE DAILY CONTACT		PARTICULARLY DESIRE HIM?	
FREQUENT OBSERVATION OF THE RESULTS OF HIS WORK	X	BE PLEASED TO HAVE HIM?	
INFREQUENT OBSERVATION OF THE RESULTS OF HIS WORK		BE SATISFIED TO HAVE HIM?	
ACADEMIC RECORDS		PREFER NOT TO HAVE HIM?	
OFFICIAL REPORTS		DEFINITELY NOT WANT HIM?	X

F.

INDICATE YOUR ATTITUDE
WOULD YOU

G. WHAT DEGREE OF SUCCESS HAS HE ATTAINED UNDER THE FOLLOWING? PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE TO DENOTE RATING. ENTER THE PROPER NUMERICAL VALUE IN THE APPROPRIATE COLUMN UNDER "TOTAL VALUE." NO VALUE SHOULD BE ENTERED FOR A RATING OF UNKNOWN. SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE.

	RAT. VAL.	Unsat.	Sat.	V. S.		EXC.		SUP.		Un- known	TOTAL VALUE	
		-4	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		-Total	+Total
1. Physical Activity and Endurance					X							3
2. Stability Under Pressure				X								2
3. Attention to Duty				X								2
4. Cooperation	X										4	
5. Initiative			X									1
6. Intelligence			X									1
7. Force					X							3
8. Judgment and Common Sense	X										4	
9. Leadership	X										4	
10. Ability to Obtain Results	X										4	

H. Since last report has been mentioned in official communications?	Favorably Yes or No No	I. During the period covered by this report was he the subject of any disciplinary measure that should be included on his record? If so, enclose separate statement of nature and attendant circumstances.	Yes or No Yes	J. In case unfavorable entries have been made, other than in D. and/or F., were the deficiencies brought to the officer's attention while under your command and prior to preparation of this report?	Yes or No Yes	Totals	-16	+12
	Unfavorably Yes or No No					K. Net Value	-4	

L. OUTSTANDING SPECIALTIES OF VALUE IN MILITARY SERVICE. MAKE NO ENTRIES EXCEPT WHERE STATEMENT IS BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATION OR OFFICIAL REPORTS. SHOW PILOT AND/OR OBSERVER RATINGS OF AIR CORPS OFFICERS.

Training and experience in gathering intelligence, particularly counter intelligence.

M. Enter numerical rating using the following basis: Numerical rating equals the net value (K) divided by total number of entries for which a numerical rating was given.

Numerical Rating
0.04

N. Enter adjectival rating based on numerical rating (M). Use following code:
Below 0 (-4) —Unsatisfactory
0.0 to 1.99 —Satisfactory
2.0 to 3.49 —Very satisfactory
3.5 to 5.49 —Excellent
5.5 to 7.0 —Superior

Adjectival Rating
Unsatisfactory

O. I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185.

ENCLOSURES	SIGNATURE /s/ Edward J. F. Glavin	TYPE NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN, Col, Inf 2677 Regt OSS (Prov)	COMMANDING WHAT? 2677 Regt OSS (Prov)
------------	--------------------------------------	---	--

1ST. IND.

TO: Major Robert Bishop, 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov), APO 512, U.S. Army.

1. Forwarded under the provisions of par 5, AR 600-185.
2. For remark and immediate return to this headquarters.

/s/ Edward J. F. Glavin
/t/ EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Inf
Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:


GERALD R. MURPHY
Major, AGD

INSTRUCTIONS
(SEE AR 600-185)

1. Efficiency ratings comprise an evaluation of an officer in comparison with others of the same grade. In a large group of officers, such as are normally assigned to an Infantry division, the law of averages will establish that about twenty percent of the officers of each grade may be superior; about twenty percent may be in the two lower classifications of very satisfactory and satisfactory (Unsatisfactory officers should be identified promptly and reclassified); the remaining sixty per cent who constitute the mass of thoroughly capable officers would fall into the excellent category. Commanders of regiments and large units must analyze the reports prepared within their organization and whenever the distribution varies markedly from the above the reasons must be sought. It is highly important that officers who are genuinely superior be identified by their ratings so that their talents may be fully utilized. It is also important to identify those officers whose qualifications and standards of performance of duty are above the minimum required, but who are clearly below the standard established by the mass of officers of their grade. A series of reports of an individual officer should present a highly accurate evaluation of his worth.

2. Prior to filling in Section G of this report consider carefully the following definitions and the numerical values assigned to each. Keep them in mind when rating, taking into consideration the length of service of officer you are rating and the opportunities afforded him, which might have a bearing upon his performance of duty, personal characteristics, or professional qualifications.

Unsatisfactory: Performance of the particular duty reported upon or personal characteristics or professional qualifications below minimum standards—inefficient.

Satisfactory: Performance of the particular duty reported upon or personal characteristics or professional qualifications up to minimum standard—passably efficient.

Very Satisfactory: Performance of the particular duty reported upon in an efficient manner. Personal characteristics, professional qualifications, or efficiency above that acceptable as satisfactory.

Excellent: Performance of the particular duty reported upon in a very efficient manner. Personal characteristics, professional qualifications, or efficiency above very satisfactory but below superior.

Superior: Outstanding and exceptional performance of the particular duty reported upon. Personal characteristics, professional qualifications, or efficiency above that considered excellent.

Unknown: To be used in all cases in which the reporting officer has had insufficient opportunity during the period covered by this report to observe the officer reported upon to permit a rating as to the performance of the particular duty, his personal characteristics, or professional qualifications.

SECRET

Statement covering Item "I" on Efficiency Report of Major Bishop

Major Bishop was on TD in Bucharest and received orders to proceed to Caserta, Italy on the first available aircraft after 10 March 1945. On 11 April he was informed by an officer from the Air Section, American Allied Control Commission in Rumania, that space was reserved for him on an airplane departing that day. Major Bishop, without authority and in disobedience to the order referred to, stated that he would not be able to depart at the scheduled time. He thereupon made himself unavailable for further contact until after the plane has departed. For this disobedience he was relieved of all duty and his movements were restricted to the city of Bucharest.

Further, Major Bishop had a part in effecting the movement of a Rumanian national from Rumania to Yugoslavia in direct violation of an order given him that he was not to have any part whatever in the "escape" of anyone from Rumania to another country.

SECRET